U.S. Nuclear Policy Unveiled: From South Africa’s Nuclear Disarmament to Iran’s Resistance

Since the establishment of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States has ostensibly positioned itself as the guardian of this order, seeking to control the spread of nuclear weapons globally through diplomatic, economic, and at times military means. However, a comparative study of U.S. behavior toward countries that have pursued different paths in their nuclear programs—from developing and testing nuclear weapons to voluntarily halting or peacefully limiting nuclear technology—reveals that Washington has in practice followed a fluctuating, selective, and unilateral strategy. This approach, rather than adhering to the principles of international law and the technical standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has largely been shaped by immediate geopolitical interests and strategic considerations.

A comparison of U.S. approaches toward different countries at various points in time clearly reveals this lack of consistency: turning a blind eye to the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan despite their overt weapons tests; initial indifference toward South Africa’s clandestine program during the apartheid era; temporary flexibility followed by a hardline confrontation with North Korea; and finally, imposing severe sanctions, taking a harsh stance, and even launching military attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities—even within the framework of a multilateral agreement (the JCPOA) and under the most stringent IAEA inspections. These stark contrasts raise fundamental questions about the real criteria behind U.S. nuclear policy decisions and their impact on global security and international trust.

In the evolving landscape of international relations, U.S. nuclear policy has not only failed to contribute to global order but has, through its unilateralism, encouraged the clandestine pursuit of nuclear programs by other states. As a nuclear-armed country and a custodian of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States is itself obligated to pursue gradual nuclear disarmament. However, it has not only neglected this commitment but in recent years has undertaken extensive planning to modernize its nuclear arsenal. This reveals a singular underlying policy: a desire to maintain unrivaled global dominance in an increasingly tense world—and to ensure its survival in that world through nuclear weapons.

The experience of Libya—where voluntary disarmament was followed by military intervention and the collapse of the government—sent a clear message to other states: “Security cannot be guaranteed through surrender.” Meanwhile, India, despite not being a member of the NPT, has enjoyed the benefits of nuclear cooperation with the United States, and Pakistan, despite accusations of past proliferation activities, has remained under relatively soft management. In contrast, North Korea, citing repeated threats, expanded its weapons program and ultimately emerged as a de facto nuclear power.

• South Africa

From the 1940s through the 1980s, the United States maintained a deep yet contradictory relationship with South Africa in the nuclear domain. This relationship was initially driven by Cold War strategic interests, including access to uranium for expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and establishing deterrence against Soviet influence. However, growing concerns over apartheid and nuclear proliferation led to increasing domestic and international pressure on Washington to scale back its cooperation. Despite this pressure, the United States never fully severed its ties with South Africa. American officials argued that a complete cutoff would diminish U.S. influence over South Africa’s nuclear program and weaken its ability to exert pressure. Instead, the U.S. sought to shape South Africa’s nuclear trajectory through continued engagement.

History shows that U.S. administrations from Truman to Reagan maintained a remarkably consistent approach in preserving nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Once nuclear proliferation became a prominent issue following the Kennedy administration, successive U.S. governments continuously advocated for strong non-proliferation policies toward South Africa. The only notable difference influenced by party affiliation was in tone and rhetoric: Democratic administrations were generally more outspoken in their public criticism of South Africa than their Republican counterparts.

Policy decisions across various U.S. administrations reveal that changes in government had little significant impact on America’s nuclear policy, and maintaining a degree of influence and control over South Africa’s nuclear behavior was considered a strategic priority. Despite the United States’ vastly superior economic and military power, it failed to effectively pressure South Africa to alter its nuclear or racial policies. As South Africa’s nuclear program advanced during the 1970s and 1980s and the country became increasingly isolated on the international stage, U.S. influence steadily declined. Washington’s nuclear cooperation with South Africa illustrates how—even when providing valuable assistance—the U.S. had limited leverage over the actions of an allied state.

Truman Administration (1945–1953)

• Initiated cooperation with South Africa in uranium mining for the U.S. weapons program.
• Signed an agreement in 1950 to purchase uranium at a guaranteed price.
• Overlooked racial discrimination due to Cold War priorities and the need for strategic resources.
• Began forming a strategic alliance with the apartheid government.

Eisenhower Administration (1953–1961)

• Expansion of scientific cooperation through the Atoms for Peace program
• Delivery of the SAFARI-1 reactor and enriched uranium to South Africa
• Training of South African nuclear scientists by the United States
• Emergence of concerns regarding the military use of the acquired technologies

Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (1961–1969)

• Pressure to impose IAEA safeguards on reactors
• Refusal to renew certain collaborations following growing criticism of apartheid
• Efforts to balance pressure for racial reforms with maintaining strategic influence

Nixon and Ford Administrations (1969–1977)

• Continuation of the NSSM 39 policy (constructive engagement with white-led governments)
• Renewal of nuclear agreements with minimal opposition
• India’s 1974 nuclear explosion heightened concerns over technical cooperation with South Africa

Carter Administration (1977–1981)

• Passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) and termination of cooperation with countries whose nuclear programs were not under IAEA safeguards.
• Halt of nuclear fuel shipments to South Africa.
• Discovery of a possible nuclear bomb test site in the Kalahari Desert (1977).
• Suspected nuclear explosion in the Indian Ocean (Vela Incident, 1979).

Reagan Administration (1981–1989)

• Policy of constructive engagement—limited interaction aimed at applying indirect pressure.
• Unsuccessful efforts to bring South Africa back under international oversight.
• Passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986), which significantly restricted interactions.
• Until 1991, South Africa secretly maintained its weapons program, which was later dismantled by President de Klerk.

Conclusion
The nuclear relationship between the United States and South Africa demonstrates that the U.S. initially had significant influence over South Africa’s early nuclear program. However, this influence declined once South Africa’s program became more advanced—especially after it acquired the capability to produce enriched uranium. By the time the United States began questioning the logic of peaceful nuclear cooperation as a tool for non-proliferation, it was already too late to prevent South Africa from developing an independent nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, U.S. efforts to use various forms of cooperation, including nuclear collaboration, to encourage reforms in South Africa’s apartheid system had little meaningful impact.

Nuclear cooperation was one of the tools through which the United States maintained its relationship with an important ally. Although countries like West Germany and the United Kingdom were considered more vital allies due to their proximity to the center of Cold War tensions in Europe, maintaining strong ties with non-Western European nations—such as South Africa—allowed the U.S. to demonstrate its global commitment to the fight against communism and to uphold the cohesion of the international anti-communist alliance. Moreover, within the context of Cold War geopolitics, the U.S. commitment to South Africa was not particularly surprising, as South Africa had positioned itself as a reliable ally in the Cold War and provided the United States with strategic mineral resources and other goods essential for the global struggle against communism.

Nevertheless, alongside all strategic considerations, domestic concerns about apartheid and nuclear proliferation were strong enough to put significant pressure on the U.S.–South Africa relationship. Cold War priorities were not so dominant that American policymakers could completely ignore these pressures—particularly during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. This reflects the growing intersection between U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy. Thus, U.S. nuclear cooperation with South Africa serves as a clear example of how Cold War priorities initially led the United States to establish and maintain ties with South Africa. However, over time, emerging domestic and international concerns placed increasing strain on that relationship. Ultimately, these pressures disrupted the cooperation, as U.S. policymakers struggled to balance competing Cold War-era concerns—such as the fight against communism, opposition to racial discrimination, and efforts to curb nuclear proliferation.

• Libya

Libya began its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Muammar Gaddafi’s main motivations included enhancing deterrence capabilities, elevating Libya’s regional status, and countering Israel. Through the nuclear black market—including the Abdul Qadeer Khan network—Libya acquired centrifuge equipment and blueprints related to nuclear weapons. However, its program never reached the stage of bomb production. One of the key reasons for the program’s failure was organizational inefficiency and a lack of technical and managerial capacity. Despite financial investment and access to illicit nuclear technology, the weak state structure and shortage of skilled personnel prevented the project from becoming operational. This illustrates that even strong motivations and substantial resources are insufficient without an effective institutional framework.

In response, the United States imposed severe economic and diplomatic sanctions on Libya. However, in 2003, following sustained international pressure and promises of normalized relations, Libya voluntarily abandoned its nuclear programs and began extensive cooperation with the U.S. and the IAEA. Initially, Libya’s dismantling and handover of centrifuge and weapons-related technologies—particularly missiles—was hailed as a “diplomatic success” and presented as a model for other countries like North Korea. Over time, however, the Libyan case also came to be viewed as a “cautionary tale” about broken promises and the shifting nature of U.S. foreign policy. Gaddafi had initially pursued nuclear weapons with clear strategic intent, but ultimately—through internal strategic reassessment and shifting national priorities—he made a significant decision to change course and abandon the weapons program.

After committing to disarmament, Libya expected tangible benefits in return for the political cost of abandoning its nuclear program—such as the swift lifting of sanctions, arms sales, and security guarantees. However, these promises were not quickly fulfilled, and soon anger and feelings of humiliation grew among Libyan officials. Ultimately, the fall of Gaddafi’s regime following the 2011 uprisings and Western support confirmed this breach of trust: “They should never have been trusted.”

Analysts believe that although a combination of pressure, diplomacy, accurate intelligence, and, if necessary, military threat can be effective, factors such as geography, the level of economic dependence on the West, and the extent of U.S. knowledge about each country’s weapons program vary significantly. For this reason, some Western analysts argue that a comprehensive policy tailored to each case should be based on a careful cost-benefit calculation rather than a simplistic repetition of the Libyan model. Otherwise, what initially appears as a successful outcome could turn into a costly endeavor that undermines global trust and drives others to resort to non-negotiable deterrence options.

 

 

• India

Over the past decades, the United States has consistently claimed leadership in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, yet its behavior toward certain countries, including India, reveals clear contradictions in the implementation of this policy. India’s nuclear program and U.S. policy toward it have been among the most complex and evolving issues in international relations over the past half-century. From the early years of its independence, especially starting in the 1950s, India began efforts to develop nuclear technology. The initial goal of this program was the peaceful use of nuclear energy, supported by countries such as the United States and Canada. However, in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, labeled a “peaceful explosion,” which triggered strong negative reactions from the U.S. and the international community. This test led the United States to halt its nuclear cooperation with India and impose sanctions against the country.

Following the 1974 test, the United States adopted a policy aimed at isolating and limiting India’s nuclear capabilities. This approach was reinforced by the passage of the NNPA in 1978 and the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The goal of these policies was to prevent India from accessing nuclear technology and materials through international channels. India, emphasizing its independence and national security, did not join NPT. In 1998, India conducted a series of new nuclear tests, officially declaring itself a nuclear power. In response, the U.S. imposed new economic and military sanctions on India, but gradually a path toward dialogue and cooperation began.

With the dawn of the 2000s and shifting geopolitical dynamics—especially following the September 11 attacks—the U.S. adopted a different approach toward India. The George W. Bush administration sought to forge a new strategic relationship by engaging more closely with India. A turning point in this shift was the U.S.–India civilian nuclear agreement in 2005, which was officially finalized in 2008. Under this agreement, the United States allowed India to participate in international nuclear trade despite its non-membership in the NPT, on the condition that its civilian nuclear facilities would be placed under IAEA’s safeguards. This deal ended India’s nuclear isolation and opened the door for cooperation with other countries such as Russia and France.

1– From Cooperation to the First Nuclear Shock (1948–1974)

• 1948: Establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission; research began with a focus on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
• 1955: Construction of the CIRUS reactor with assistance from Canada and the United States under the Atoms for Peace program.
• 1968: Canadian inspectors raised concerns about the potential military use of plutonium from the reactor.
• May 18, 1974: India conducted its first nuclear test, named Smiling Buddha, using plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor.

U.S. Reaction:

• Condemnation of the test, suspension of sensitive technology exports, and support for the establishment of NSG.
• Passage of the NNPA, restricting assistance to countries that are not members of the NPT.

2– Pressure and Constraints, but No Severe Confrontation (1974–1998)

• Despite its criticism, the United States did not fully sever its strategic relationship with India.
• During the 1980s, U.S. policy focused more on containing the India–Pakistan rivalry and encouraging both countries to exercise restraint.

U.S. Political Approach:

• Efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear technology without exerting full-scale pressure; avoidance of open confrontation.

3– Pokhran-II Nuclear Tests (May 11–13, 1998)

• India conducted five new nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear weapons state.

U.S. Response (Clinton Administration):

• Imposition of economic sanctions under the Glenn Amendment.
• Diplomatic pressure to limit regional competition with Pakistan.
• Gradual easing of sanctions within two years and rebuilding of bilateral relations.

4– Strategic Shift and Formal Acceptance of India (2005–2008)

• 2005: Initial agreement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on peaceful nuclear cooperation.
• 2006: U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act to authorize nuclear collaboration with India.
• 2008: The U.S. successfully secured an exemption for India from NSG rules, allowing India to participate in the global nuclear fuel and technology market.

Historic Shift: The United States effectively recognized India as a nuclear power outside the NPT framework.

In recent decades, the nuclear relationship between India and the United States has become part of a broader strategic partnership. The U.S. has supported India’s membership in key export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Efforts have also been made to include India in the NSG, although this has been blocked by China. Overall, the nuclear relationship between the two countries has shifted from confrontation to cooperation, now grounded in shared interests across security, energy, and technology sectors. In a speech at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi on January 8, 2025, former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated:

“Although former President Bush and former Prime Minister Singh laid out a vision for civilian nuclear cooperation twenty years ago, we have yet to fully realize it. But as we strive to build clean energy technologies, advance growth in artificial intelligence, and empower American and Indian energy companies to unlock their innovative potential, the Biden administration has decided that the time has come to take the next big step in strengthening this partnership.”

In contrast to the Libyan experience—which led to disarmament followed by regime collapse—India’s case illustrates that persistence in maintaining a nuclear program does not necessarily result in permanent isolation. In fact, under certain conditions, it can lead to long-term international legitimacy and even strategic partnerships. This stark contrast highlights a key critique in discussions on nuclear justice and the international order: the inconsistency in U.S. behavior toward different states, often shaped more by strategic interests than by uniform non-proliferation principles.

The shift in U.S. policy toward India’s nuclear program—from confrontation and sanctions to cooperation and partnership—had multiple reasons rooted in geopolitical developments, strategic interests, and political realism.

• Decline in the Effectiveness of Restrictive Policies

After decades of sanctions and pressure, the United States and other Western countries realized that nuclear isolation policies had little impact on stopping or rolling back India’s nuclear program. India not only refused to halt its program but formally established itself as a nuclear power in 1998. Therefore, the U.S. concluded that instead of confrontation, it was better to accept the reality and manage India through cooperative engagement.

• Growing Geopolitical Importance of India

In the 2000s, India emerged as a rising economic and political power in Asia. The United States viewed India as a potential ally to counter China’s increasing influence. Closer ties with India became part of the broader U.S. strategy to balance power in Asia. In fact, partnering with India could help contain China and strengthen U.S. influence in the region.

• Developments Following September 11

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States sought regional partners to address its primary goal of global instability. India, as a large and stable democracy, was seen as a natural partner for the U.S. This political closeness led the U.S. to replace its previous hardline stance toward India’s nuclear program with a more pragmatic approach.

 

 

• India’s Large Market and Growing Economy

With a population of over one billion and rapid economic growth, India represented a vast market for technology, energy, and military-industrial cooperation. American companies, including those in the civilian nuclear energy sector, sought to gain a share of this market. The 2008 nuclear agreement opened the door for such collaborations.

• India’s Responsible Nuclear Track Record

Although India is not a member of the NPT, it has demonstrated relatively responsible behavior in the nuclear arena: it has never transferred nuclear technology to other countries and has adhered to a “minimum deterrence” doctrine. This conduct helped build greater trust between the U.S. and India.

Conclusion

The United States treated India differently not because of adherence to non-proliferation principles, but due to strategic interests and geopolitical realism. This policy is based on targeted discrimination and accommodation of power realities, rather than on principles of international law or nuclear justice. While the U.S. has taken a hardline confrontational stance toward countries like North Korea and Iran, it adopted a constructive—even encouraging—approach toward India, a country that is not only outside the NPT but has also conducted nuclear tests. By accepting India’s nuclear status, the U.S. aimed to reduce its isolation and, through its partial integration into the international system, secure its own interests as well.

• Pakistan

In January 1979, U.S. intelligence services were surprised to discover that Pakistan had secretly initiated a uranium enrichment program using gas centrifuges. The information included the establishment of enrichment facilities in the cities of Kahuta and Sihala, under the direction of Abdul Qadeer Khan. As a result, the U.S. government realized that Pakistan was moving toward nuclear capability at a much faster pace than previously anticipated.

According to declassified documents, the United States proposed a plan to control the export of sensitive technologies through cooperation with NSG member states and was prepared to respond if Pakistan crossed certain strategic “red lines.” Options under consideration included applying financial pressure or potentially suspending military assistance. Ultimately, Washington adopted a cautious approach, initially seeking to contain Pakistan’s program through covert diplomacy and multilateral pressure.

Ultimately, U.S. efforts over the following two decades proved largely ineffective: Pakistan continued its nuclear program, developed weapons, and conducted nuclear tests in 1998. This outcome revealed that, despite having strong intelligence, the United States refrained from taking serious action against Islamabad due to geopolitical interests. In the long run, this policy contributed to the establishment of a new nuclear regime in South Asia.

The United States adopted a dual and pragmatic approach toward Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Despite being aware of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment efforts and bomb development, the U.S. largely turned a blind eye due to its strategic reliance on Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. After the Soviet withdrawal, U.S. aid was suspended, but no substantial pressure was applied. In 1998, following Pakistan’s nuclear tests, the U.S. imposed temporary sanctions that were soon lifted. Even after the exposure of the Abdul Qadeer Khan proliferation network, the U.S. response was limited to placing Khan under nominal house arrest, avoiding any serious legal or international accountability.

In contrast, North Korea—which directly threatens the United States—has faced unprecedented pressure, complete isolation, and comprehensive sanctions. Iran, despite being a member of the NPT and cooperating with the IAEA, has repeatedly come under severe sanctions, threats, and even military attacks on its peaceful nuclear facilities. This comparison highlights that U.S. behavior in nuclear non-proliferation is primarily driven by strategic interests rather than consistent adherence to fixed principles.

1– The Beginning of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program (1970s)

• 1974: Following India’s Smiling Buddha nuclear test, Pakistan decided to pursue nuclear capability for “mutual deterrence.”
• 1975–1976: Abdul Qadeer Khan returned to Pakistan from the Netherlands and established a supply network for centrifuge and enrichment technology—based on documents stolen from the URENCO facility in the Netherlands.

U.S. Response:

• Initially viewed Pakistan’s actions with suspicion but refrained from a strong response due to its close Cold War alliance with Islamabad.
• U.S. focus was more on preventing India’s armament than on explicitly halting Pakistan’s nuclear program.

2– Program Revealed and Beginning of U.S. Pressure (1979–1987)

• 1979: The Soviet coup in Afghanistan led the U.S. to strengthen Pakistan as a strategic partner in the war against the USSR. At the same time, evidence surfaced in Washington indicating Pakistan’s ongoing development of nuclear capabilities.
• 1985: The Pressler Amendment was passed, stipulating that the U.S. could only provide military aid to Pakistan if the President certified that Pakistan was not pursuing nuclear weapons.

U.S. Behavior:

• In practice, the United States turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear activities, as cooperation in Afghanistan took precedence.
• Later documents revealed that U.S. officials were aware of the progress in Pakistan’s nuclear program but deliberately avoided disclosing it.

3– Imminent Testing and Rising Tensions (1990s)

• 1990: After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. suspended military aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment.
• Intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan was capable of producing a nuclear bomb on short notice.
• 1998: Following India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan conducted five reciprocal nuclear tests in Chagai, officially becoming a nuclear weapons state.

U.S. response:

• Immediate economic sanctions were imposed, but under strategic pressures, these sanctions were lifted within a few years.
• Bill Clinton stated, “The United States opposes any nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia, but understands Pakistan’s security concerns.”

4– Post-9/11 Era and Renewed Overlooking (2001-2010)

• 2001: Pakistan became a key U.S. ally in the “War on Terror.”
• During this period, Abdul Qadeer Khan was accused of selling nuclear technology to North Korea and Libya.
• 2004: Abdul Qadeer Khan officially admitted to selling nuclear technology. The Musharraf government placed him under house arrest.

U.S. behavior:

• Despite clear evidence of proliferation, the U.S. refrained from prosecuting or extraditing Khan. The main reasons were concerns about destabilizing Pakistan, the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists, and the need for cooperation to advance mutual interests.

5– Recent period and non-cooperation with NPT or arms control regimes (2010–present):

• Pakistan continues to refuse joining the NPT treaty.
• Estimates indicate that Pakistan currently possesses around 170 nuclear warheads, with numbers still increasing.
• In competition with India, the focus is on developing short-range tactical missiles and expanding tactical nuclear weapons.

 

U.S. Behavior:

• Unlike India, the United States has not allowed Pakistan access to the global nuclear technology market.
• However, it has not exerted major pressure for disarmament or joining the NPT, instead adopting a policy of quiet management and soft handling.

Conclusion:

Contrary to claims of principled non-proliferation, the U.S. policy toward Pakistan has practically been driven by geopolitical considerations rather than legal ones. Despite Pakistan’s overt nuclear proliferation, Washington chose engagement and strategic silence instead of meaningful punishment.

• North Korea

North Korea pursued the path to acquiring nuclear weapons over several decades, driven by a combination of political, security, and ideological motivations. Its nuclear program began in the 1950s with assistance from the Soviet Union, but until the 1980s, the focus was mainly on nuclear energy production and scientific research. From the late 1980s onward, Pyongyang gradually developed infrastructure for plutonium production through graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactors at the Yongbyon site. This phase marked the practical beginning of its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.

North Korea, by constructing and operating a 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, was able to extract plutonium necessary for building nuclear weapons. The spent fuel from this reactor was reprocessed at specialized chemical facilities to produce plutonium. Inspectors from IAEA repeatedly attempted to monitor the reactor’s activities, but limited cooperation and North Korea’s eventual withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 effectively prevented effective oversight. Estimates indicate that by the mid-2010s, North Korea was capable of producing several tens of kilograms of plutonium, enough for several nuclear warheads.

Alongside its plutonium route, North Korea has pursued a separate uranium enrichment program. Although detailed information about this enrichment program remained hidden for a long time, in 2010 American scientists, including Siegfried Hecker, visited the Yongbyon site and observed advanced enrichment facilities housing thousands of active centrifuges. This second path provides North Korea with flexibility in securing fissile material and continuously developing its nuclear arsenal.

The reasons behind North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons are a combination of national security, deterrence against the U.S. and South Korea, internal regime legitimacy, and bargaining power on the international stage. The leaders in Pyongyang believe that possessing nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee the survival of their regime and to resist external threats. The experience of regimes like Libya, which faced attacks after disarmament, has played a significant role in reinforcing this mindset. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal serves as a tool for political and economic leverage in negotiations with the West and for securing international concessions.

The U.S. political approach toward North Korea’s nuclear program over the past three decades has been a mix of negotiation, threats, sanctions, and strategic instability. In 1994, Washington attempted to persuade North Korea to halt its nuclear activities through economic aid under the “Agreed Framework,” but this deal collapsed in the early 2000s due to mutual distrust. The Bush administration labeled North Korea part of the “Axis of Evil” and adopted a more aggressive stance. In response, Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT and accelerated its weapons development. Symbolic meetings between Trump and Kim Jong Un ultimately failed due to mismatched demands—complete denuclearization versus full sanctions relief. The U.S., oscillating between diplomacy and pressure, has been unable to establish an effective and stable strategy to contain North Korea.

1- First Nuclear Crisis (1993-1994)

• In 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and restricted inspections by IAEA.
• In 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed the “Agreed Framework”: North Korea agreed to halt operations at the Yongbyon reactor in exchange for oil aid and the construction of light-water reactors.

U.S. Behavior: Negotiations and economic incentives were used to halt nuclear activities without actual disarmament; a policy of soft containment.

2- Collapse of the Agreement and Start of Armament Path (2002–2006)

• 2002: The Bush administration labeled North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil”; Pyongyang was accused of a secret uranium enrichment program.
• 2003: North Korea withdrew from the NPT; the U.S. adopted a tougher policy.
• 2006: North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.

U.S. Behavior: Shifted approach from negotiation to pressure and threats; failed to fully uncover North Korea’s programs due to Pyongyang’s complete cutoff from the IAEA, expulsion of inspectors, and implementation of severe sanctions.

3- Second Round of Negotiations and Another Failure (2007–2009)

• 2007: Resumption of Six-Party Talks (involving China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the U.S., and North Korea). A temporary agreement was reached, but North Korea did not accept the IAEA’s demands.
• 2009: Pyongyang withdrew from the talks and conducted its second nuclear test.

U.S. Behavior: Returned to multilateral diplomacy but with deep mistrust; lacked binding mechanisms or full monitoring.

4- Escalation of Crisis and Direct Threats from the U.S. (2016–2017)

• North Korea began testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
• Trump threatened “fire and fury” and imposed unprecedented sanctions; at the same time, he pursued direct meetings with Kim Jong Un.

U.S. Behavior: Intense verbal confrontation combined with personal diplomacy; however, no lasting progress in denuclearization was achieved.

5- Trump–Kim Talks and Complete Deadlock (2018–2019)

• Three meetings were held between the two leaders (Singapore, Hanoi, and the DMZ).
• No comprehensive agreement was reached; the main disagreement centered on lifting sanctions versus complete denuclearization.

U.S. Behavior: Tactical flexibility without a strategic shift; insisted on full denuclearization before offering any concessions.

Conclusion:

The U.S. approach toward North Korea’s nuclear program has been marked by fluctuation, strategic instability, and a failure to design a consistent long-term policy. While sanctions, threats, and negotiations were applied intermittently, North Korea skillfully exploited these cycles and has now emerged as a de facto nuclear power.

• Iran

Iran’s nuclear activities date back to the 1960s, beginning with the launch of the Tehran Research Reactor in 1967. Iran was among the first countries to sign the NPT in 1970, and in 1974, it entered into a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, which came into effect the same year. Since the mid-1980s, Iran has pursued an integrated domestic peaceful nuclear program, primarily aimed at acquiring nuclear technology to meet its growing energy needs. From the outset, Iran has consistently emphasized the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities and maintained its commitment to the NPT as a core principle of its nuclear policy. Citing religious decrees (fatwas) from its Supreme Leader, Iran has repeatedly declared that it does not seek weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Despite extensive cooperation with the IAEA — including the provision of frequent reports, the acceptance of broad inspections, and the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol during certain periods — U.S. policy toward Iran’s peaceful nuclear program has largely been shaped by pressure, severe sanctions, threats, and, in recent years, military attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. On the other hand, Iran has consistently pursued the policy of a nuclear weapons-free (NWFZ) Middle East, but Israel remains a major obstacle to achieving this goal in the region.

Iran’s proposal and pursuit of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East dates back to the 1970s and has been part of its declared policy to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This idea was first jointly presented by Iran and Egypt to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Iran has maintained this position over time and, along with Arab countries, has annually submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly calling for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. These resolutions have been adopted by an overwhelming majority, although they are not legally binding. Iran has also repeatedly emphasized this demand in international forums—particularly the IAEA and the NPT Review Conferences—calling for the complete nuclear disarmament of the Israeli regime.

By reaching the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran demonstrated that it had no intention of militarizing its peaceful nuclear program. The agreement restricted Iran’s uranium enrichment to levels far below those needed even for a power reactor (limited to 3.67%), clearly reflecting the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. However, the United States was not satisfied even with this level of peaceful nuclear activity and has consistently sought to completely halt Iran’s civilian nuclear program. This stance constitutes a violation of Iran’s inherent rights under the NPT.

The Israeli regime, under the pretext of Iran approaching the nuclear weapons threshold and with U.S. support, launched an attack on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities on June 13, 2025. The precedent for such actions by Israel dates back to similar strikes on nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007, both carried out under the same justification.

Comprehensive Conclusion

The United States’ approach toward the nuclear programs of various countries has consistently been shaped by geopolitical considerations, national interests, and strategic pragmatism, rather than by fixed principles or uniform standards within the framework of international law or non-proliferation. As the self-proclaimed guardian of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the U.S. has long claimed leadership in this area. However, its conduct toward different countries reveals that this leadership has been exercised selectively and discriminatorily.

The U.S. policy toward the indigenous nuclear programs of independent countries, if unable in the first stage to completely eliminate their peaceful nuclear activities, moves in the second stage toward establishing bilateral or multilateral agreements aimed at rolling back and containing the program at a minimal level—so that it can pursue a suitable policy at a later time. This approach was implemented with regard to North Korea; however, the country, upon realizing the true nature of U.S. policy, ultimately withdrew from the NPT.

In the case of countries like Iran and North Korea, Washington has pursued a hardline policy involving maximum pressure, extensive sanctions, and military actions—even when Iran has remained a member of the NPT and carried out its activities under IAEA supervision. In contrast, countries such as India and Pakistan, which have never joined the NPT and have openly conducted nuclear weapons tests, have been met with a softer approach or even strategic cooperation. A clear example of this is the signing of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement in 2008 and the blatant U.S. disregard for nuclear proliferation by Pakistan (through the A.Q. Khan network).

In the case of Libya, the United States praised its voluntary disarmament; however, the subsequent fall of Gaddafi sent a clear message to other countries that surrendering to the West does not guarantee security. Similarly, with North Korea, U.S. policy fluctuated between diplomacy and military threats, but ultimately, the refusal to acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear reality led to the failure of diplomatic efforts.

Overall, the U.S. approach toward the nuclear programs of various countries has been defined not by universal principles, but primarily by two key criteria:

1. The extent to which a country poses a threat to U.S. interests or those of its allies.
2. The strategic value of that country to Washington’s foreign policy.

This reality has weakened the global non-proliferation regime and diminished countries’ trust in the fairness of international structures. The ultimate outcome is that the U.S. double standard in nuclear policy has not only failed to prevent proliferation but has, in fact, encouraged some countries—particularly those feeling insecure or threatened by the West—to pursue nuclear weapons. Therefore, a reassessment of this policy and a return to consistent, non-selective principles are essential prerequisites for maintaining international security and restoring the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

On the other hand, any country in the region or the world that seeks to develop an indigenous nuclear program will inevitably face the United States’ double standards—ultimately experiencing a trajectory similar to one of the aforementioned cases. Backed by the U.S., the Israeli regime has attacked Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities and previously targeted Iraq and Syria, sending a clear signal to regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. These nations must be increasingly cautious about any attempt to localize their nuclear programs and are, in effect, compelled to maintain a policy of dependence on U.S. nuclear technology.