Legitimizing NPT Withdrawal: Iran’s Right to Exit Amid Military Attacks on Its Peaceful Nuclear Facilities

Before the eyes of the world and in violation of international laws, the United States and the Zionist regime launched attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities. Operation “Midnight Hammer” by the U.S. on June 22 targeted the peaceful nuclear sites in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, and was carried out in two phases: a strike involving 14 GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs, each weighing 13.5 tons (used for the first time), dropped by seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers on the Natanz and Fordow facilities; and the launch of 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles from an Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarine at the Isfahan nuclear facility. In parallel, the Zionist regime began Operation “Rising Lion” on June 13, repeatedly attacking Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities, which were under strict supervision and inspection by the IAEA. Satellite imagery reveals that these attacks have caused significant damage to the facilities.

The recent attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities mark a dangerous turning point in the global nuclear dispute. These assaults, which constitute a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law, and the very foundations of on Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), not only threaten regional and global stability but also raise serious questions about the continued commitment of Iran and other nations to the NPT—and the treaty’s inability to protect nuclear facilities within Iran.

North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT was a direct consequence of the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the sharp escalation of hostility with the United States, particularly following the events of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq. North Korea initially threatened to leave the treaty in 1993 but rescinded its declaration just one day before it was set to take effect, following direct negotiations with the U.S. However, in 2003, as trust in U.S. commitments under the 1994 agreement eroded and perceptions of existential threat intensified, North Korea’s leadership concluded that remaining in the NPT not only offered no benefit but was an obstacle to acquiring nuclear weapons—the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. The final withdrawal paved the way for North Korea’s subsequent nuclear tests (starting in 2006) and its emergence as a nuclear-armed state. This case highlights the weaknesses of the NPT—such as its dependence on the political will of major powers and the lack of credible security guarantees—and the dangers arising from the failure to uphold agreements, particularly with the United States.

Given the case of North Korea’s nuclear program and the U.S.’ repeated and violations of bilateral agreements with that country, it appears that the NPT cannot protect the peaceful nuclear programs of its member states. Is Iran’s potential path to withdrawing from the NPT similar to North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty?

Iran’s Commitment to the NPT

Iran was among the first countries join the NPT in 1970 following its ratification of the treaty. According to Article III, Paragraph 1 of the treaty, each member state is required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following this provision, Iran has maintained a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA since 1974. Over the decades, and as confirmed by the Agency’s reports, Iran has remained committed to all of its obligations under this agreement.

The recent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities occurred despite the IAEA Director General’s report on May 31, 2025, which once again confirmed Iran’s technical and legal compliance with its obligations under the NPT and the Agency’s monitoring framework. This attack is not only an act of terrorism and a war crime, but also stands in stark contradiction to the documented realities affirmed by the international oversight body.

Iran’s compliance with the NPT is demonstrated through its cooperation with the IAEA:

• No Diversion of the Nuclear Program: In Paragraph 79 of the IAEA Director General’s report dated May 31, 2025 (GOV/2025/25), titled “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”, it is explicitly stated that the Agency has found no credible indications of an undeclared and ongoing structured nuclear program in Iran. This represents the most fundamental element of IAEA oversight and Iran’s core obligation under Articles II and III of the NPT.
• Continuous Presence of IAEA Inspectors in Iran: Despite having a relatively small number of nuclear sites compared to other countries, Iran has been subject to the highest number of IAEA inspections worldwide. Iran has consistently emphasized its cooperation with the Agency and has acted in full accordance with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. As clearly stated by the Director General in his recent report, Iran has provided the necessary cooperation in the implementation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It should be mentioned that according to IAEA’s Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2024, around 21% of the total global inspections has been conducted in Iran.
• Resolution of Technical Issues: Annex V of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 explicitly states that, upon the resolution’s expiration, the Security Council will recognize the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and will no longer address Iran’s nuclear file. This means that all previously outstanding issues—some of which the IAEA Director General, in his recent report, has referred back to from the 2000s—were considered resolved with the adoption of Resolution 2231 in 2015. The reopening of such matters, which had already been settled, despite Iran’s repeated assertions that it possesses neither undeclared nuclear materials nor undeclared sites without any proliferation risk, is viewed as a result of politicization and pressure exerted on the IAEA Director General by Western powers.
• Constant Submission of Declarations and Information: Following its obligations under the safeguards agreement, Iran has continued to submit design declarations and information through periodic reports on its nuclear materials and activities to the IAEA. This cooperation has persisted despite the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 JCPOA and the European parties’ failure to uphold their commitments, mirroring the U.S. breaches of the 1994 agreement with North Korea, which led to Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT. Under such circumstances, Iran would have been fully justified in suspending these obligations. However, to reduce tensions and demonstrate goodwill, Iran has continued to implement commitments, including its safeguards commitments.

Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA is also evidenced by 15 reports from the IAEA Director General, which demonstrate Iran’s proper performance within the framework of international law and adherence to its international commitments. Even after Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran showed goodwill by fully implementing the agreement for one year without waiving its right to suspend its commitments in whole or in part as envisaged in paras. 26 and 36 of the JCPOA.

These documents reflect Iran’s adherence to the NPT and its international obligations.

North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but its membership was always fraught with challenges. In 1993, the country threatened to withdraw from the NPT for the first time, which was temporarily resolved through direct negotiations with the United States. The 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the U.S., known as the “Geneva Agreement,” was intended to contain the crisis, but its incomplete implementation by the U.S. led to increased tensions.

On January 10, 2003, North Korea officially announced its withdrawal from the NPT. This was the first time in contemporary history that a country withdrew from the treaty. Pyongyang justified its withdrawal as legal under Article X of the NPT, which grants members the right to withdraw in “extraordinary events.”

Under the 1994 agreement, the United States committed to providing light-water reactors and energy assistance, including oil deliveries, to North Korea, as well as to easing sanctions. However, the delivery of reactors was delayed, and energy aid was never fully realized. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as an “Axis of Evil” threatening U.S. national security. North Korea interpreted this as clear evidence of Washington’s hostility. Subsequently, Pyongyang claimed that the U.S. intensified economic sanctions under false pretenses. Military activities in East Asia near North Korea further reinforced its argument that its nuclear program was a defensive response to U.S. military threats and the presence of American forces in South Korea. Historical records show that the U.S. failed to fully implement the Geneva Agreement:

• Several years of delay in constructing the light-water reactors;
• Reduction of the promised oil assistance quantity;
• Continued economic sanctions beyond the scope of the NPT;
• Lack of progress in normalizing diplomatic relations;
• Increased military activities in the region.

The legitimacy of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT can be examined from several perspectives:

• Article X of the NPT: This article grants countries the right to withdraw in a situation of “extraordinary events which jeopardize the supreme interests of the country.” North Korea argued that U.S. security threats and sanctions created such conditions;
• Principle of National Sovereignty: According to the UN Charter, countries have the sovereign right to make decisions regarding their own security;
• Doctrine of Material Breach (Reciprocal Breach): In international law, when one party violates its obligations, the other party may be entitled to suspend or withdraw from its commitments.

North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, as the first country to officially leave the treaty and conduct six nuclear tests from 2006 onward, dealt a serious blow to the NPT regime. This withdrawal also led to the following consequences:

• Escalation of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula;
• Multiple nuclear tests by North Korea (since 2006);
• Severe UN Security Council sanctions;
• Setting a precedent for other countries.

North Korea’s exit from the NPT was the result of the failure of multilateral diplomacy and reciprocal breaches of commitments. While the international community condemned this action, analysis shows that Pyongyang based at least part of its legal arguments on U.S. violations of its obligations. This crisis highlights the need for structural reforms in the nuclear non-proliferation regime to address legitimate security concerns of states.

Legitimacy of Iran’s Withdrawal from NPT

NPT is one of the most important international agreements on arms control. Under this treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states commit not to pursue nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states are obliged to move toward disarmament. However, some countries, such as North Korea, have withdrawn from the treaty citing security threats. In the current context, following repeated attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the question arises whether Iran should consider withdrawing from the NPT based on security threats and violations of commitments by Western parties.

Despite sanctions and Western pressures, Iran has advanced its nuclear program within the framework of NPT and under the supervision of IAEA. Nevertheless, the West—especially the U.S. and its allies—has not only failed to fulfill its commitments toward Iran but has also challenged Iran’s national security through unilateral sanctions and military actions.

The JCPOA (2015 Nuclear Deal) is a clear example of U.S. and European breaches of commitment. Despite Iran’s adherence to extensive nuclear limitations, Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and re-imposed unilateral crippling sanctions on Iran. Europe, despite its promises, failed to fulfill its economic commitments which was also a violation of the main purpose of the deal, mentioned on its preamble and Annex. These violations deprived Iran of the benefits of the agreement, while Western parties benefited from their commitments failure without facing international consequences. The U.S. and European JCPOA members have not confined their threats to mere rhetoric regarding the re-imposition of UN sanctions through the “snapback” mechanism; in reality, the U.S. attempted to activate it but lacked the legal authority to do so. Subsequently, European countries—the UK, France, and Germany—have repeatedly threatened Iran with snapback sanctions, persisting in their breaches of commitment. Iranian officials have also repeatedly stated that if the snapback mechanism is enforced by European countries, Iran will respond by withdrawing from the NPT.

Two of the most important reasons that could strengthen the legitimacy of Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT are, first, the repeated attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the inability of the treaty to protect countries’ nuclear sites; and second, the Europeans’ attempt to activate the snapback mechanism as part of their breach of this international agreement. These actions not only constitute clear violations of international law but also prove that the West has not honored its commitments to Iran and is even seeking to destroy the country’s peaceful nuclear program.

According to Article X of the NPT, any country facing “extraordinary events that threaten its supreme national interests” may withdraw from the treaty. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 citing this very provision. Similarly, Iran can justify its withdrawal by referring to the following points:

• Military attacks and security threats

The 12-day attacks by the Zionist regime and the U.S. on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities and their destruction severely threaten the country’s national security. Under such circumstances, Iran can argue that the NPT has failed to guarantee its security.

• Violation of Commitments by Nuclear Powers and Activation of the Snapback Mechanism

The U.S. and European countries have not only failed to fulfill their commitments to Iran under the JCPOA but have also obstructed Iran’s access to peaceful nuclear technology. This can be interpreted under international law as a “material breach” or “reciprocal breach,” similar to North Korea’s justification for its withdrawal, granting Iran the right to exit the NPT.

• Double Standards of the West Regarding Nuclear Programs

While the West ignores the nuclear program of the Zionist regime —a non-NPT member—it scrutinizes even the smallest peaceful nuclear activities of Iran. This discriminatory behavior calls into question the legitimacy of the NPT implementation.

Given the repeated attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities, coupled with the systematic violations of commitments by the West under the JCPOA and the threat to activate the snapback mechanism, Iran can justify its withdrawal from the NPT by invoking Article X of the treaty and its right to national sovereignty. This step, if hostile behavior by the West continues, may be the only viable solution to ensure Iran’s national security. Ultimately, the international community must increase pressure on the Zionist regime and the U.S. to abandon their double-standard and aggressive policies toward Iran; otherwise, the severe weakening of the NPT and the expansion of the nuclear crisis in the region and the world will be inevitable.

Effects of Withdrawal

The NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear arms control regime, has played a key role since 1970 in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the withdrawal of any significant country—especially a member state like Iran—can deliver a severe blow to the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT.

1. Weakening the Legitimacy and Credibility of the NPT

The withdrawal of a key regional member state like Iran, which has been under the supervision and inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for years, delivers a serious blow to the legitimacy and credibility of NPT. This treaty is based on cooperation among members and mutual adherence to commitments; therefore, Iran’s departure could set a precedent for other countries that may justify their withdrawal when faced with international threats or pressures. Such an approach would create an unpredictable and unstable order in the global nuclear arena.

The NPT is founded on a “Grand Bargain”: non-nuclear-weapon states agree to forgo nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to disarmament steps. Violations of these commitments by nuclear powers (such as the United States failing to reduce its arsenal) and discriminatory enforcement (such as differential treatment of the Zionist regime) have already damaged the treaty’s credibility. Iran’s withdrawal could reinforce the perception that the NPT is a tool to contain independent states rather than a fair system for collective security.

2. Increased Tensions and Nuclear Competition in the Region

Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT could accelerate the development of nuclear technology for defensive or even military purposes. This move would likely prompt other countries in the region to reassess their nuclear programs and may ignite a regional arms race. Neighboring states, especially in the Middle East, might use these developments as justification to initiate or expedite their own nuclear efforts, posing a severe threat to regional security. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly stated that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would follow the same path. This could lead to a nuclear rivalry in the Middle East similar to that between India and Pakistan, which would seriously undermine regional stability. Turkey has also expressed dissatisfaction with the perceived injustice in how nuclear-armed countries respond to its pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

3.Weakening the Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Oversight Framework

One of the key pillars of the NPT is the monitoring and inspection role of the IAEA. Iran’s withdrawal from the treaty would effectively block regular access and inspections by this agency. This situation would not only lead to international distrust, but could also seriously undermine the credibility of the IAEA, which has already been damaged by its failure to condemn the Zionist and U.S. aggression against Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities, and further weaken the international oversight structure.

4.The Necessity for Revising the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The potential crisis of Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT demonstrates that the nuclear non-proliferation regime requires reform and strengthening. Legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear countries, the weakness in guaranteeing their security, and failures in reciprocal commitments by major powers are all factors that have made the current system vulnerable. To preserve this regime, the international community must find ways to ensure the security of states and enhance transparency and mutual trust. If other countries follow Iran’s example and exit the NPT, the treaty may lose its effectiveness and give way to a multipolar nuclear system. In such a scenario, arms control would become more difficult, and the risk of accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons would dramatically increase.