Tehran on Edge: Murder and Assassination by Israel and Its Aftermath
Sasan Karimi
Adjunct professor, University of Tehran (sasan.karimi@ut.ac.ir)
Program director of Intl. politics, Nuclear Watch Network
Terror is always heinous and inhumane, but the worst instance can occur on an inauguration day, targeting both the host and the guest, when many other politicians are also in the city.
Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, in the north of Tehran a few hours after the inauguration ceremony of Dr. Massoud Pezeshkian, the newly elected reformist president of Iran, whose core discourse involves elevating relations with all states through mutual respect and constructive cooperation.
It seems that besides eliminating Haniyeh BB Netanyahu seeks at least four different goals out of this terror:
- He attempts to bypass his personal and Israeli deadlock by expanding the war into the region and rehabilitating his image in Western media and public opinion,
- Putting the ceasefire process into the fire,
- Interrupting Iran’s new administration by putting Pezeshkian into a passively reactional position,
- Breaching Iran’s authority and sovereignty,
To be accurate, it is not true that he was unsuccessful in all the dimensions above: the ones dependent on his action only were fulfilled: Mr. Haniyeh was assassinated, the sovereignty of Iran was breached on its own soil, and the ceasefire process was also suspended at least for a predictable period of time. But the other ones which are related to his own political destiny and also Israel’s situation in the coming months depend on the reactions from Iran.
Of course, retaliation is among Iran’s rights under article #51 of the United Nations charter which tells:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Politically, however, the right to retaliate should be exercised in a very calculated and well-designed manner.
Iran cannot surprise its opponent at the time being, as everyone anticipates a military retaliatory operation from Tehran. This will be tolerated and as is predictable enough, most probably would not lead to a real war in the region as no actor in the region and beyond wants a war except Israel. So, Iran will not give Netanyahu what he put this trap for.
Also, it seems that through this situation on the surface, Iran seeks more achievements than a symbolic retaliation in the depth. This is why compensation may not only come from Israel and not limited to a military retaliation but also from various players, including the United States—the biggest supporter of Israel’s military and intelligence—and European countries in the region.
A multi-dimensional compensation may also include a military retaliation operation but should not be limited to it necessarily. It also should consider not stepping into a passive and reactional position that Israel designed and is ready to use to reconstruct its “legitimacy” in the Western medium through its classic oppressed game.
The other important topic is the worry Israel has because of the new administration in Tehran which is in its first weeks. Israel’s goals in this dimension could be firstly to keep re-securitizing Iran through its nuclear program: Israel has spent a lot to securitize Iran in different ways including “think tanks” like ISIS or UANI. The most compelling question it could present to Western media and political environments concerns Iran’s nuclear program, which the IAEA has repeatedly approved as peaceful. But all around this program which caused international (before JCPOA) and unilateral sanctions (also after the U.S. withdrawal from the deal) is a classical securitization program with all its institutional, political, and media supports. Especially with the new administration of Iran with key people like Javad Zarif and Abbas Araghchi who are famous as the best Iranian deal-makers, especially in the nuclear de-securitization process, Israel is not going to let Pezeshkian start a new era in Iran’s diplomacy with a new atmosphere around the nuclear program.
Another dimension is the presidential election in the United States between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. Trump who can step back from unconditioned support of Israel in the GAZA genocide, is already aligned with Israel about Iran and its nuclear program. Trump may know that the whole story is a project but the basis of his negative approach is mostly an internal one because this was Obama who made the nuclear deal with Iran on the American side. Harris could accuse Trump as the real cause of Iran’s post-withdrawal nuclear advances including bigger stockpiles, higher levels of enrichment, and different development and research including the most advanced and sophisticated centrifuges. This can upside down the situation of Donald Trump’s position in Iran’s case. Israel is trying its best to prevent the new Iran’s administration to indirectly pressure Trump in the coming months.
The third motivation could be escaping from the two-state solution which already has the declining support of Arabs, the United States, Russia, and the European Union. Israel which is the destructor of this solution should escape somehow from the responsibility of the job. Netanyahu should put the ceasefire and the solution into the fire the way of which was a terror like this to end up and overshadow the solution.
Whatever Iran is going to do in retaliation should be and would be considering all the dimensions above and this can include multi-dimensional and not limited to what is being predicted by everyone and can have more symbolic impact than a real multi-dimensional deterrence.
