An Analysis on IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolution (GOV/2024/39) NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3 Statement June 2024
Sasan Karimi
Adjunct professor, University of Tehran (sasan.karimi@ut.ac.ir) & Program director of Intl. politics, Nuclear Watch Network
During the 1723rd session of the IAEA Board of Governors on June 5th, 2024, we finally witnessed a European will to issue an anti-Iranian resolution, regardless of the previously anticipated expectations from Washington. It remains unclear whether this was a mere game of good and bad policies or a reality. Some sources reported that the US envoy had requested a milder tone for the resolution.
To avoid getting lost in the details of this long issue, it is better to first organize our thoughts. Iran has potentially three types of “bindings” to the IAEA:
- Actions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- Actions under the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP).
- Commitments under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA (CSA).
The first type of actions is under the JCPOA. As it is a “joint” plan of actions and not fulfilled by the other JCPOA participants, the actions by Iran also are not expected to be in force as officially stated. This is not any sort of “withdrawal” or “breach” of the deal as is structurally predicted in the deal text under paragraph #26. This is why the IAEA reports on Iran’s failure with the JCPOA limitations do not mean much; Iran already and initially declared reducing the implementation of such actions in return for the non-compliance of the other participants including the United States.
Another section of Iran’s bindings is the AP, which had been basically voluntary implemented by Iran for a couple of terms, and again in return for releasing certain pressures. In both cases, nobody can expect unilateral implementation of the limitations with the same pressures that are continuously being imposed.
The third type of commitments are the ones under the NPT Safeguards Agreement Iran signed in 1974 with the IAEA, i.e. the CSA. Under this agreement, Iran has no limitation on the level of uranium enrichment and the amount, nor any obligation to accept all the designated inspectors of the IAEA and alike.
Under Article #9 of the CSA, Iran has the right to withdraw the designated inspectors of the IAEA. The IAEA can propose other inspectors, which it did not. Only if Iran repeats the withdrawal multiple times would it be a case. The Agency didn’t designate any further inspectors after Iran withdrew a few. Insisting on the same group of the inspectors does not show any legal or technical foundation for the Director General’s positions; maybe it is personal, political, or at least organizational.
Another case that the IAEA challenges Iran for, and also is indicated in the present resolution of the Board of Governors, is the implementation of the Modified Code 3.1, which relates to the manifesting timeframe of any new nuclear facility. Iran’s argument is that despite the fact that this was modified content before and outside the JCPOA, but it is also mentioned in paragraph #13 of the nuclear side of the voluntary measures as well as the paragraph #65 of the annex #1 of the nuclear deal.
As nothing is mentioned in the nuclear deal of 2015 without a proportionately-paid return inside the JCPOA, complying with what is mentioned in the deal afterwards substantially differs from the same but before that and does not make any sense. Thus, as Iran does not receive the considered returns, complying with paragraph #65 would be unilateral and obviously unfair; that is why Iran considered it under the reduction of the implementation of the actions under paragraph #26.
As another case mentioned in the resolution, the accounting of nuclear material happens technically and only raises serious questions or complications when political pessimism is behind it. This political aim is clearer when we see that it relates to the years 2003 and 2004, the period of time that used to be on “no further question” at the time of the JCPOA.
All the above items that are mentioned in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution are due to Iran’s compliance with its CSA and mostly about over a couple of decades ago, which requires severe effort to distinguish from the case of PMD. However, in order to find ways to break such impasses that IAEA claims, we can review what has been done similarly in the past, including the same case of PMD. It is always almost impossible to judge people’s aims. It is also not easy to verify all the probable aims and activities a State with a big land has been doing for over a couple of decades. So how could the IAEA conclude about the case of PMD which used to be an open and unsolvable issue between them? The reality is that it was declared by the Director General Amano, not officially related to but exactly at the same time as the nuclear deal. Before that time, the Agency repeatedly was like it cannot conclude that there was no Probable Military Dimensions for Iran’s nuclear program since 2001. But suddenly, when the big picture calms on the political side, it has been solved with a simple indirect sampling for which Amano traveled to Iran by himself. There was no extra open door in front of the Agency and the Director General, but the political atmosphere was positive and looking forward, the Agency could conclude that there are no further questions remaining about the case.
The other documents we have seen during the last week were the statement of the E3. Great Britain, Germany, and France insisted mostly on Iran’s compliance to the JCPOA, which is the other type of Iran’s potential bindings. The European powers seem very concentrated on the nuclear and not the sanctions side of the deal. “Nuclear limitations” are mostly what Iran was considered to be compliant to in return for the “impactful releasing of the sanctions,” which was the other parties’ share of the deal. The first part has a watchdog which is the IAEA, but the second part naturally could not be monitored and verified by some third party or so. But it can never be forgotten that this is a joint, balanced, and voluntarily-structured deal with no legal and unconditional obligations as a typically ratified treaty in international law. Therefore, Iran is compliant to it only on the same level the other parties are impactful. This level is almost nothing in practice after the US withdrawal in May 2018 and not joining back in Biden’s era. Other participants which are still the existing Member States of the deal could not have done any real and objective retaliation. That is why, as discussed, Iran’s releasing of its limitations is exactly under the deal and not any sort of “breach” in any fair evaluation.
But the three European powers, which probably were not able to put the same JCPOA-based tone and content in the resolution, mentioned their unilateral dissatisfaction on a statement regardless of Iran’s dissatisfaction. This shows a vast intention of putting pressure on Iran especially when the final sunset of the JCPOA is coming in October 2025, the time that the six UNSC nuclear resolutions against Iran will get terminated permanently and irreversibly. This is the only benefit Iran could take from the deal to de-securitize itself perpetually and its nuclear program at the United Nations Security Council.
In case there is no motivation remaining for Iran from the nuclear cooperation, why should Iran take further steps to answer any manifested concern of the Agency or the permanent members of the Security Council? For the time being, arguing for clearance and cooperation in the sensitive areas with the countries above is more than difficult for the pro-deal parties; what is easy to monitor during the coming days leading to the presidential election there.
