Avoiding the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Policy of Deliberate Ambiguity: Strategies for the Nuclear Program of Iran

By Hossein Ajorlou

Senior Researcher of  Middle East Security Studies at Nuclear Watch Network

An active strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to pursue a peaceful nuclear program as a basic requirement of modern life and the development of civilian research by stressing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Iran has always endeavoured to promote a similar policy in all its diplomatic, institutional, and legal activities at the regional and international levels, particularly in the Middle East region.

For example, in a television program aired on 13th January 2024, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Mohammad Eslami, explicitly stated in answer to the question posed by the presenter on the will of Iran to develop nuclear weapons that this has no place in the country’s defence doctrine despite Israel’s extensive nuclear weapons program being a constant threat to the security of Iran and the Middle East region. He stated the reason as the order of respect decreed by the Supreme Leader of Iran on obtaining nuclear WMDs as well as a range of non-nuclear deterrence tools available to Iran. This is further emphasis by Iran on its two main strategies for a peaceful nuclear program: 1) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 2) Avoiding a policy of deliberate ambiguity.

Key strategies on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were adopted for the following reasons:

1. The ruling political system in Iran is one based on religious and humanitarian values. Based on authentic Islamic resources, Muslims must always be prepared to defend themselves; however, they must observe military ethics and avoid excessive violence and mass killings. In addition, persistent reiterations by Ayatollah Khamenei as the national and religious leader of Iran on the religious order of banning developing nuclear WMDs once again re-emphasized the need to observe this religious and humane principle. It must be added that, based on Article 110 of the IRI constitution, the Supreme Leader determines all the defense, security, and political strategies of Iran.
2. Iran’s strategic insight into the non-applicability of nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use in the modern world, unlike the Cold War era, is another reason for reluctance by Iran to proliferate nuclear weapons. The reasons behind this strategic insight in the country’s decision-making circles are as follows:
3. The concept of war moving away from mass killings to effective point attacks due to access to weapons and technologies with high operational accuracy by the military.
4. Expansion of the concept of human rights and the high cost of mass killings due to international condemnation, the image of countries destroyed in the global public opinion, and the ensuing costs in the modern world.
5. Countries realizing the long-term destructive effects of nuclear weapons on the human environment and their spread to wider areas, including the territory of the state deploying the weapon.
6. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by different countries with varying levels of power reducing the relative advantages of nuclear deterrence.
7. The high cost of development, safety, security, repair, and maintenance of nuclear weapons by nuclear countries.
8. Iran is concerned about an expanding nuclear arms race in West Asia and its consequences due to irresponsible states and the lack of strong nation-states (weak governments forming and lacking control over their nuclear arsenal). There is also the danger of placing these weapons at the disposal of terrorist groups. For instance, official cabinet ministers in Israel as an irresponsible government speak of using nuclear weapons in their warfare.
9. The government of Iran believes that conventional deterrence, alliances, and coalition building at the regional and international levels provide the required deterrence force for this country. Despite the perceived threats ahead, Iran is not faced with an authentic existential threat prompting it to change its present defense doctrine to a costly, inhumane doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In other words, the current approach provides Iran with relative deterrence power both in political and defensive security terms, reducing its requirements for other types of deterrents, including nuclear weapons, to zero.

Another strategy pursued by Iran is that of avoiding the policy of deliberate ambiguity. To this end, apart from the non-ambiguous statement made by Mohammad Eslami as the Head of the AEOI, all other official entities in Iran, from the Supreme Leader to other sectors, have also explicitly emphasized that the country is not attempting to obtain nuclear weapons.

In addition to the emphasis by its official authorities, Iran has also taken steps to avoid deliberate ambiguity and clarify its program in line with the standards of global nuclear governance, including safety, security, and non-proliferation.

Iran’s extensive cooperation with the IAEA to maximize the transparency of its nuclear program, such as accepting statutory and voluntary monitoring and verification measures by the IAEA and the installation of surveillance cameras to apply comprehensive safeguards inspections and the additional protocol are unprecedented. If at times it has restricted access to certain locations, it was intended to maintain the safety and security of its nuclear program or as countermeasures against the political actions of international parties. It must be noted that Iran has repeatedly suffered blows and leaks of sensitive information on its nuclear program through certain IAEA departments and activities by rival intelligence services (assassination of its nuclear scientists and cyber sabotage of critical infrastructure). Nevertheless, its cooperation with the IAEA is ongoing.

Despite adopting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and avoiding the policy of deliberate ambiguity by Iran confirmed by IAEA technical reports, certain countries, entities, and figures with anti-Iranian political objectives are working towards the securitization of this country’s peaceful nuclear program, the most significant of which are as follows:

1. Political figures and currents in competing countries, including the US, EU, and Israel, continue to pursue the securitization of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and reaching international and regional consensus against this country with political and security objectives by constructing a case on Iran’s nuclear threat with a series of general claims without supporting evidence. For instance, considerable statements have been made by US officials and the European troika, as well as inflammatory declarations by Israel, on this subject. A glance at history shows the footprints of these countries in making baseless claims against the nuclear activities of Iraq and the occupation of this country when, at a later date, it became clear that the process was intended to make a case to justify these belligerent actions which imposed substantial costs on the people of the region and US and European taxpayers.
2. Think tanks such as The Institute for Science and International Security and The Foundation for Defence of Democracies have taken steps for the securitization of Iran’s case by adopting anti-Iranian policies influenced by anti-Iranian lobbies and promoting war by Western countries based on biased reports. Over the past two decades, these institutes have produced literature, as well as interviews with credible media, using the “breakout time” keyword to portray an imminent production of nuclear weapons by Iran. These claims have time and again been rejected by official and expert IAEA reports, but have left their lingering trace on the securitization of Iran’s case at various international, institutional, and political levels to maximize sanctions against it.
3. On occasion, IAEA elements become involved in political approaches versus its specialized duties and make estimates based on political judgments contrary to the technical reports confirming Iran’s commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For instance, on 16 October 2023, Rafael Grossi adopted a political, non-technical approach at the Annual US State Department Arms Control Conference by saying: “We have to deploy every effort to prevent this problem, this current debate on what is happening and what can be done in Iran (from) becoming a failure on the part of the international community to prevent a country that has capabilities which could potentially lead to the development of nuclear weapons from doing it, We saw the failure of this type in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea.”

In conclusion, under the present scientific and economic sanctions imposed on Iran and despite efforts by certain sides for the securitization of its nuclear program, this country needs to advance its peaceful nuclear program based on global nuclear governance standards, including safety, security, and non-proliferation, and avoid the adoption of a policy of deliberate ambiguity and using nuclear weapons as a deterrent to increase its security.